Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence by Bradley, Steve et al.
Employment Protection, Threat and
Incentive Effects on Worker Absence
Steve Bradley, Colin Green and Gareth Leeves
Abstract
This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment
protection on worker absence. We use novel multi-organization data to examine
changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent
employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment
protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of
employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We
also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers’ absence is inﬂu-
enced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of
dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of
employment protection effects has important policy implications.
1. Introduction
A long-standing concern of the literature on employment protection legisla-
tion is its impact on labour market transitions and unemployment. However,
recently a literature has also developed that speciﬁcally focuses on the effect
of employment protection on worker effort measured through variations in
absenteeism (Engellandt and Riphahn 2005; Ichino and Riphahn 2004, 2005;
Olsson 2009; Riphahn and Thalmaier 2001). The key insight from this litera-
ture is that increased employment protection substantially reduces worker
effort. It is suggested that this reﬂects workers’ greater fear of job loss when
employment protection is limited. The majority of this evidence comes from
workers on ex ante known ﬁxed probation periods. In practice, in many
countries including Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Australia,
workers can be on ongoing temporary contracts where transition to perma-
nent employment may occur in the future with uncertainty over both the
likelihood and timing. Critically, workers without employment protection
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instance, it may be easier for workers to maintain higher levels of effort for
short probationary periods than in ongoing temporary employment. This
could consequently lead to different observed effects of employment protec-
tion on absence in these alternative scenarios. This article therefore seeks to
add to the existing evidence on employment protection effects on worker
effort by examining a situation where the transition to permanent employ-
ment is uncertain.
While existing research has stressed that the lack of employment protection
increases effort (reduces absence) because of an increased fear of job loss, the
effort decisions of workers with limited employment protection may also be
affected by incentives (Audas et al. 2004; Wilson and Peel 1991). Speciﬁcally,
temporary or probationary work contracts may be used by employers to
screen workers for suitability for permanent contracts (Booth et al. 2002;
Green and Leeves 2004). Moreover, permanent jobs may offer a range of
beneﬁts, such as higher pay or access to future promotions that may provide
further incentives for temporary workers to work harder in addition to
employment protection. Together, this suggests that there may be a number
of attributes of permanent employment that provide incentives for these
workers to signal effort, over and above a general desire to signal underlying
productivity.
It is important to consider the effect of opportunities to obtain jobs that
offer employment protection as the overall impact of changes in employment
protection regulations may hinge on this. For example, easing unfair dis-
missal laws could lead to higher effort due to an increase in the risk of job loss
but may have a contrary effect if ‘protected’ jobs become scarcer, and hence
the opportunity to gain permanent employment is reduced. These types of
issues will become more important as the balance between temporary and
permanent workers changes, as is currently happening in many OECD coun-
tries under policies such as ‘ﬂexicurity’.
This article uses a large novel personnel dataset to examine these issues.
Our dataset covers an entire public sector workforce in Australia, and we use
this to investigate changes in absence as workers move from temporary to
permanent contracts. The institutional setting is advantageous to the study of
employment protection effects on absenteeism. This is because the workforce
is characterized by jobs with limited employment protection, temporary con-
tracts and permanent contract workers who are very difﬁcult to dismiss.
Furthermore, these contract types do not vary in a number of key dimensions
such as rates of pay, leave entitlements and other fringe beneﬁts. Hence, we
argue that conditional differences in absenteeism between temporary and
permanent workers in our data are more likely to reﬂect variations in
employment protection and opportunities for promotion.
1
Our data, unlike that used in previous research, are not survey based or
from a single ﬁrm but instead, cover a multi-organization and multi-plant
workforce. As a result, we provide an estimate of the impact of employment
protection across a range of occupations and organizational settings. The
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lack any clear predetermined exogenous change in employment protection
effects, there is the potential for endogeneity bias of the contract estimates.
For example, it may be the case that unobservably better temporary workers
make a quicker transition to permanent status. Thus, individual ﬁxed-effects
models are estimated to control for time invariant differences in worker
characteristics. Furthermore, we also examine the robustness of our results
when allowance is made for the possibility of time varying changes in absence
propensity. Finally, we provide instrumental variable (IV) estimates of con-
tract effects. A second contribution of this article is that we utilize our
multi-organizational setting to extend earlier research by providing evidence
to suggest that, in addition to contract effects, perceived changes in the
chance of gaining a permanent contract inﬂuences the effort decisions of
workers without employment protection.
In summary, we ﬁnd that workers on a temporary contract do, on average,
take less absence than if they were employed on a permanent contract. Our
estimates of employment protection effects are markedly lower than that
reportedbyIchinoandRiphahn(2005)butsimilartothosereportedbyOlsson
(2009). This suggests that the context in which the transition from temporary
to permanent work takes place affects worker effort. Speciﬁcally, greater
uncertaintyoverthetimingofthetransitiontopermanentstatusreduceseffort
when compared to the ﬁxed event horizon associated with probation. We
undertake a series of robustness checks and approaches to identiﬁcation, but




The effect of employment protection on labour market outcomes has been a
source of ongoing debate. A speciﬁc focus has been its potential to inﬂuence
the speed of labour market transitions and hence unemployment (Acemoglu
and Angrist, 2001; Blanchard and Portugal 2001; Lazear 1990 and Kugler
and Pica 2008). More recently, a literature has developed that seeks to
demonstrate the effect of employment protection legislation on worker effort
choices (Engellandt and Riphahn 2005; Ichino and Riphahn 2004, 2005;
Olsson, 2009; Riphahn and Thalmaier 2001).
Measurement of effort presents a key difﬁculty. This literature has largely
dealt with this by focusing on one particular measure of effort — worker
absenteeism. In some senses, this does not seem the most obvious measure.
However, absence measures have the advantage of being available in a
variety of data sources. Moreover, the existing literature has demonstrated
how worker absence responds to economic incentives in a way analogous to
effort. For instance, Audas et al. (2004) show how larger promotion prizes
lead to lower worker absence. More recently, Scoppa (2010a) found that the
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unemployment rate in a way that suggests greater shirking when job queues
are shorter.
One of the earliest articles on absence and employment protection was by
Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) who analysed survey data on German public
sector workers and found a large increase in absence after six months of
tenure, which corresponded to an automatic increase in employment pro-
tection. They also noted that absence probabilities exhibited non-linearities
in the ﬁrst six months of tenure; absence was particularly low in the ﬁrst two
months. In a series of studies of Italian bank workers, Ichino and Riphahn
(2004, 2005) found quite marked effects of increased employment protection
on worker absence. These articles examined workers in a setting where a
signiﬁcant level of employment protection automatically came into opera-
tion after workers completed 12 weeks of employment. Speciﬁcally, they
demonstrate an increase in the rate of absenteeism after workers gain
employment protection of around 100 per cent. As they note, however,
increased worker effort in the early stages of an employment contract could
be motivated by the desire to signal underlying productivity.
2 They relied
upon identifying employment protection effects from changes in absence–
tenure patterns. More recently, Olsson (2009) demonstrated that a legisla-
tive reduction in employment protection in small ﬁrms (10 or less workers)
in Sweden reduced absence by 13 per cent, when compared to ﬁrms with
12–50 workers who were not subject to the legislative change. Scoppa
(2010b) examines a similar reform whereby dismissal costs for small ﬁrms
were increased, and this reform led to a 3 percentage point increase in the
incidence of absenteeism.
3. Background and preliminary evidence
Background
The data used in this study were collected by the state government of Queen-
sland in Australia as part of the Minimum Obligatory Human Resources
Information (MOHRI) database. The database holds quarterly information
on approximately 180,000 public sector workers, and in this study refers to
the period from quarter 1 2001 to quarter 3 2004, inclusive. In Australia, state
governments account for 65.8 per cent of all public sector employees and
have responsibility for core services, such as education, health, corrective
services, emergency services and law enforcement. The remaining public
sector employees work in the federal government (23 per cent) and local
government (11.2 per cent). State government workers make up approxi-
mately 12.5 per cent of the total employed labour force in Queensland.
Workers in the Queensland public service can be employed on one of
four types of contract — temporary, permanent, contract or casual. It is
important to note the key differences between these contract types. Casual
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contract starts and ends on each day of work. While contract workers are
hired for speciﬁc short-term projects, neither group is entitled to sick or
holiday pay (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996). As a result of this, we
exclude casual and contract workers from our analysis.
Temporary employment contracts are ﬁxed-term contracts that are
renewable, and there is no maximum number of times that a contract can
be renewed. These workers can be ﬁred or their contract may not be
renewed; this is observed regularly in our data. This is generally in line with
evidence that temporary work is not very strictly regulated in Australia (see
for instance, OECD 2004). In contrast, workers on permanent contracts are
tenured and extremely difﬁcult to dismiss. For instance, quarterly dismissal
rates for permanent employees in our data range from 0.00006 to 0.0019.
Hence, public sector permanent contracts in Australia more closely
resemble permanent workers in a number of continental European coun-
tries in terms of employment protection. As a result, like previous studies,
we are comparing a wide variation in employment protection. A problem
could arise if temporary and permanent job vary in characteristics other
than just employment protection. In this case, any observed variation in
effort between temporary and permanent employment could reﬂect a range
of factors. Critically for our purposes, temporary and permanent con-
tracted jobs in our setting do not vary fundamentally in terms of leave, pay
entitlements or other beneﬁts. The key distinction is in terms of ease of
dismissal. There is no obvious disadvantage to a temporary worker from
taking a permanent contract, and hence there is no reason to suspect a
‘non-compliance’ problem whereby temporary workers would be offered,
but not accept, a permanent contract. Indeed, using this same dataset,
Mangan and Tunny (2004) ﬁnd evidence to suggest that temporary employ-
ment is part of a stepping stone to permanent employment when compared
to those employed on a casual basis. Transitions to permanent employment
can occur at any time and are at the discretion of each government depart-
ment. Clearly, departments will have varying practices in how they manage
the use and progression of temporary workers. Worker absence may there-
fore vary systematically across departments, and it is therefore important to
control for inter-departmental differences in our analysis.






of leave. This is recorded in MOHRI as hours of leave per quarter at a
frequencyofupto0.25ofanhour.Bothtemporaryandpermanentcontracted
workers gain sick leave entitlements of two weeks a year.
A number of decisions were made regarding excluding workers and obser-
vations from our analysis. First, the key interest is in changes in absence
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lems. Thus, we exclude workers who are on long-term unpaid absence leave
due to ill health. In addition, we also exclude workers who take particularly
long periods of paid absence in a quarter as they are unlikely to be making
effort decisions at the margin.
3
By its very nature our data exhibit attrition as workers leave the public
sector. Moreover, this attrition is likely to be correlated with observable
characteristics, and potentially, unobservable characteristics. This may bias
estimates of contract effects. One option is to focus on a balanced panel of
observations (i.e. excluding leavers). While econometrically attractive, this
seems to us likely to have other unappealing side effects such as introducing
sample selection bias. We therefore retain workers who leave the service but
also check the robustness of our results once they are excluded.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides an overview of MOHRI, split by contract status and
gender. Temporary workers are, on average, younger and have considerably
lower tenure than permanent workers. They work less hours, on average,
than permanent contracted workers. They are, however, predominantly full
time. For instance further investigation of the data reveals that 70 per cent of
temporary workers are on full-time equivalency (FTE) rates of over 80
per cent, the corresponding rate is 80 per cent of permanent workers. While
there is some difference in the occupational distribution of temporary and
permanent contracted workers, temporary workers are still found across the
range of occupations in the public sector. Temporary workers are also more
likely to be indigenous Australians (Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
(ATSI)) or from an Asian background. Average absence rates per quarter are
approximately 2 per cent of contracted hours for temporary workers and 3
per cent of contracted hours for permanent workers. These differences in
absence levels between permanent and temporary workers are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level, for both males and females.
The Queensland public sector workforce is organized into a range of
departments according to function (portfolio). These include departments
covering health, education, police services, correctional services, emergency
services, roads, transport and a range of policy orientated departments. In
total, there are 51 departments in our data period, but as a result of depart-
mental reshufﬂes and amalgamations, there are never 51 departments at one
point in time. Generally, there are 32–40 departments in operation within any
given quarter. There are large variations in the use of temporary contracts
across these departments, including variation in the rates of temporary
workers’ job loss (q) and the rate of temporary workers’ movement from
temporary to permanent contracts (transition rate) (g). Table 2 provides
summary statistics on temporary contract use by department.
4 On average, in
any given quarter, roughly 16 per cent of departmental workforces are tem-
porary; 11 per cent of these temporary workers separate from the public
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demonstrate that, despite their common institutional framework, there is
variation in departmental practices regarding the use of temporary workers.
Some departments, for instance 1 and 24, use a relatively large proportion of
temporary workers, with high turnover and low transition rates to permanent
contracts. Others, such as department 2, clearly view temporary workers as
potential permanent employees. Furthermore, the reported standard devia-
tions, provided in parentheses in Table 2, demonstrate that transition rates
(g) and the risk of temporary contract non-renewal (q) vary substantially
within departments over the sample period. These intra-departmental
changes could affect worker absence behaviour.
TABLE 1
Sample Means, Queensland Public Service 2001(1)–2004(3), Age 20–65
Temporary Permanent
Male Female Male Female
Absence (hours in quarter) 7.913 7.674 13.555 13.042
Absence rates (per quarter) 1.82% 2.02% 2.93% 3.21%
Hourly wage ($AUD) 21.519 20.243 25.271 23.085
Age (years) 35.902 36.561 42.275 40.775
Tenure (years) 3.031 2.745 13.911 10.111
Non-English speaking
background (NESB):
European 0.020 0.024 0.023 0.024
Asian 0.050 0.035 0.023 0.026
Other 0.025 0.022 0.041 0.039
Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander (ATSI)
0.035 0.031 0.019 0.019
Disability 0.044 0.037 0.081 0.06
Full-time equivalency (FTE) 0.923 0.807 0.981 0.863
Workforce temporary (%) 0.201 0.174 0.115 0.124
Establishment size 1058 947 895 989
Occupation:
1. Manager 0.022 0.011 0.055 0.013
2. Other professional 0.305 0.190 0.193 0.108
3. Teacher 0.131 0.201 0.182 0.292
4. Nurse 0.020 0.073 0.031 0.128
5. Associate professionals 0.131 0.089 0.244 0.105
6. Tradespersons 0.100 0.003 0.064 0.003
7. Advanced clerical and
service workers




0.150 0.336 0.116 0.269
9. Intermediate production
and transport workers




0.046 0.051 0.013 0.012
11. Labourers and related
workers
0.07 0.028 0.067 0.053
Observations 108,976 235,682 789,234 1,325,468
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI) data.
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workers suggest that departments with a higher proportion of temporary
workers have lower temporary worker separation rates and lower rates of
transition to permanent contracts. Rates of job loss and rates of transition
from temporary to permanent contracts are positively correlated.
Preliminary Findings
To provide initial evidence of the correlation between absenteeism and con-
tract type, we used the complete MOHRI dataset of all permanent and
TABLE 2
Departmental Variation in the Use of Temporary Contracts












1 0.220 (0.085) 0.199 (0.122) 0.055 (0.085) 191 (17.342)
2 0.060 (0.038) 0.068 (0.068) 0.218 (0.084) 2848 (184.441)
3 0.086 (0.056) 0.114 (0.182) 0.123 (0.036) 6218 (889.1352)
4 0.188 (0.049) 0.064 (0.048) 0.097 (0.060) 2185 (166.709)
5 0.312 (0.038) 0.091 (0.092) 0.048 (0.032) 233 (65.873)
6 0.063 (0.017) 0.133 (0.051) 0.106 (0.027) 4312 (248.931)
7 0.121 (0.066) 0.159 (0.052) 0.047 (0.026) 3338 (883.113)
8 0.159 (0.042) 0.177 (0.130) 0.101 (0.022) 2563 (478.902)
9 0.314 (0.121) 0.101 (0.111) 0.048 (0.025) 1315 (50.907)
10 0.129 (0.023) 0.079 (0.085) 0.078 (0.027) 4597 (149.510)
11 0.278 (0.114) 0.138 (0.095) 0.045 (0.016) 808 (83.990)
12 0.136 (0.135) 0.043 (0.083) 0.020 (0.012) 3674 (874.159)
13 0.233 (0.124) 0.064 (0.113) 0.051 (0.016) 4181 (123.629)
14 0.219 (0.059) 0.136 (0.056) 0.076 (0.042) 401 (150.358)
15 0.092 (0.035) 0.053 (0.072) 0.070 (0.057) 67179 (4470.110)
16 0.166 (0.079) 0.108 (0.081) 0.063 (0.030) 2474 (177.293)
17 0.133 (0.054) 0.054 (0.075) 0.159 (0.043) 47347 (6064.655)
18 0.242 (0.016) 0.096 (0.086) 0.045 (0.033) 1213 (65.128)
19 0.111 (0.079) 0.098 (0.049) 0.072 (0.029) 2454 (141.062)
20 0.074 (0.051) 0.180 (0.037) 0.116 (0.110) 347 (39.791)
21 0.169 (0.043) 0.073 (0.132) 0.040 (0.033) 248 (23.546)
22 0.049 (0.017) 0.132 (0.270) 0.109 (0.096) 504 (9.318)
23 0.040 (0.046) 0.216 (0.045) 0.116 (0.015) 186 (64.079)
24 0.327 (0.078) 0.039 (0.100) 0.043 (0.071) 155 (14.535)
25 0.023 (0.030) 0.196 (0.289) 0.271 (0.286) 11746 (413.860)
26 0.177 (0.056) 0.081 (0.050) 0.059 (0.030) 817 (45.641)
27 0.178 (0.032) 0.072 (0.034) 0.044 (0.030) 307 (34.505)
28 0.088 (0.025) 0.113 (0.054) 0.111 (0.047) 1506 (86.981)
Mean 0.156 (0.106) 0.106 (0.121) 0.086 (0.091)





Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI). For conﬁdentiality
reasons we do not report department names. To illustrate the variability of these variables,
across sample period standard deviations at the departmental level are reported in parentheses.
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workers take on average 5
1/2 hours more absence per quarter than temporary
workers (see Table 1). This differential may arise because of variations
between workers with respect to observable and unobservable characteristics
that are associated with absence. Thus, we estimated a regression model of
quarterly absence with a vector of controls for time-varying characteristics of
workers, workplace characteristics and worker ﬁxed effects to capture time-
invariant individual unobservable characteristics. In unreported estimates,
these show that male permanent workers took 1.932 [s.e. 0.243] more hours
absence per quarter, and female permanent workers took 2.181 [s.e. 0.143]
morehoursabsenceperquarterwhencomparedtotemporaryworkers.Thus,
a smaller, but statistically signiﬁcant, differential in absence levels remains
after controlling for observable and time-invariant unobservable characteris-
tics. Our aim is to determine the extent to which this is a result of a change in
employment protection, or a reﬂection of other factors.
Rather than continue to examine the full MOHRI dataset, we choose to
focus on a cohort of workers who enter the public sector on a temporary
contract during the 2001 calendar year. We do this for a number of reasons.
First, this set-up is comparable to other studies of early career absenteeism
(Ichino and Riphahn 2005). Focussing on a cohort allows us to use work-
place level information drawn from the full sample (excluding the cohort) to
generate variables which proxy for the opportunity to move to a permanent
contract. In addition, we avoid biases in the full sample related to the non-
random pre-sorting of workers into tenure groups and contract types at the
start of our sample period.
Our cohort was selected to maximize the sample size of temporary con-
tracted entrants while allowing sufﬁcient time to observe their subsequent
absence behaviour. These workers are then followed for up to 14 additional
quarters, providing they remain in the public sector workforce. Sample
means for the cohort are reported in the Appendix as Table A1. Compared to
our full sample of temporary workers, our entrant cohort are younger, work
longer hours; and while the distribution of occupational type is similar, there
is some slight indication that the entrants are more likely to be in lower-
skilled occupations. Table A2 provides a summary of the transition patterns
of the cohort. This demonstrates that while a lot of transitions occur within
the ﬁrst ﬁve quarters of employment, many temporary workers gain perma-
nent contracts after this period. In our results, we discuss the robustness of
our results to cohort choice and timing of transition.
4. Empirical methodology
Employment Protection and Absenteeism
Our main estimating model of absenteeism is:
AP e r m X W Z it i it it it ijt it =+ + + + + αφ β δ ω ε (1)
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individual speciﬁc ﬁxed effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant
differences between workers. Permi is the worker’s time-varying contract
status, here denoted by a dummy variable identifying permanent contract
status. Hence, estimates of f are identiﬁed in this model by workers moving
between contract states, speciﬁcally from temporary to permanent employ-
ment. Xi is a vector of time-varying personal characteristics, including tenure,
and Wi is a vector of time-varying workplace and work-related characteris-
tics. There may be differences in departmental management practices in
relation to absence management and/or the treatment of temporary workers.
Thus, we introduce controls for unobservable workplace characteristics.
Ideally, we would include a ﬁxed effect for every workplace in the public
sector. However, this would require the inclusion of over 1,500 ﬁxed effects.
Instead, we include ﬁxed effects for each of the 51 departments in the public
sector where Zijt is a dummy that is equal to one if worker i is in department
j at time t. We observe the hourly wage in the data, but note that the wage is
likely to be endogenous and exclude this from our empirical models. None-
theless, all of our key results are robust and essentially invariant to the
inclusion of wages as a control in our regression models. Finally, absenteeism
is likely to have a seasonal component. We therefore introduce controls for
the quarter of the year where the ﬁrst quarter (January to March) is the
omitted base case.
A key feature of our institutional setting is that progression from tem-
porary to permanent employment contracts is discretionary. Temporary
workers can be offered a permanent contract at any time. This gives rise to
variation between tenure and changes in the level of employment protec-
tion. At the same time, the assignment of temporary workers to permanent
contracts in our data is unlikely to be a random event. This non-random
assignment has the potential to bias the estimates of contract effects on
absence. Temporary workers may be assigned, or assigned earlier, to per-
manent contracts on the basis of absence behaviour or unobserved charac-
teristics that affect absence behaviour. In this case, temporary workers with
better (i.e. lower) absence behaviour move to permanent contracts earlier.
Our main identiﬁcation strategy draws on the particular strength of our
dataset; we use individual and agency level ﬁxed effects in an attempt to
eliminate time-invariant unobservable differences in individual assignment
from temporary to permanent contracts. A few points are worth noting
about this strategy.
First, the individual ﬁxed-effects approach is appropriate if temporary
work is being used as a screening mechanism prior to assignment to per-
manent contracts, and this screening occurs on the basis of (arguably) time-
invariant characteristics such as ability. The contract effect derived from
the ﬁxed-effects approach provides an estimate of the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT). For this to be generalizable to an average
treatment effect (ATE), the unobservable absence of the non-treated group
should to be independent of the treatment. An issue is that if the best
10 British Journal of Industrial Relations
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.workers, in terms of unobserved time-invariant absence propensity, are
selected into permanent contracts our ATTfe may provide a biased esti-
mate of contract effects. We seek to investigate this in a number of
ways; we demonstrate the remarkable similarity between those who gain
permanent employment and untreated ‘non-movers’ across a range of key
dimensions. More generally we provide a series of additional robustness
checks.
However, a fundamental identiﬁcation problem may still exist if, for
instance, time-varying shocks to absence or productivity determine assign-
ment. In this case, our ﬁxed-effects approach will not mitigate unobserved
variable bias. We seek to investigate this further by providing instrumental
variable estimates of contract assignment and subsequent absence differ-
ences. This is discussed in more detail in the results.
Temporary Worker Absenteeism and Permanent Job Opportunities
The second contribution of our article is to investigate whether temporary
workers’ effort is inﬂuenced by their place in the organizational structure in
addition to any contract transition effects. As in Audas et al. (2004), we have
personnel records for an organization with a deﬁned hierarchical structure.
They ﬁnd that position in the hierarchy affects effort, above and beyond the
ﬁnancial reward associated with movement up the hierarchy. Speciﬁcally,
those lower in the hierarchy exerted more effort, which conforms to other
theoretical and empirical evidence. Temporary workers are not part of the
formal hierarchy but have the possibility of entry into tenured permanent
employment and subsequent advancement in career. We examine if the
strength of the linkages between the temporary and permanent workforce,
the stepping stone, inﬂuences worker effort.
We proxy for the degree of connection between the temporary and per-
manent labour forces using the transition rates from temporary contracts to
permanent contracts within the worker’s department (g), as previously
reported in Table 2. Note that this is created from the complete MOHRI
dataset excluding our cohort of temporary contracted entrants. In addition,
we introduce a control for time-varying changes in local conditions, such as
a change in work culture that could affect absenteeism in the workplace and
through that change individual worker behaviour. For instance, Ichino and
Maggi (2000) demonstrate how peer absence behaviour can spill over on to
individual worker absence decisions. A particular concern is that time varia-
tion in g may coincide with changes in workplace absence norms. We seek
to control for this by including a variable measuring average workplace
absenteeism (excluding the ith worker). The well-known reﬂection problem
(Manski 1993) means that we cannot necessarily interpret the coefﬁcient on
the average workplace absenteeism as a causal estimate of so called ‘peer
effects’, rather it provides an indicator of association between workplace
and individual absenteeism. Nevertheless, earlier work with this dataset
focusing explicitly on peer effects provided evidence suggesting a positive
Employment Protection on Worker Absence 11
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the case of teachers (Bradley et al. 2007). This leads to the following empiri-
cal speciﬁcation:
AZ X W P e r m g it i ijt ijt n it it it ijt it =+ + + + + + + − αω ϕ γ β δ φ λ ε (2)
where g is the measure of transition from temporary to permanent contracts
in workplace j for worker i at time t-n, and g measures average workplace
absence in workplace j for worker i at time t. The expectation is that j < 0
and l > 0. The former would indicate that temporary workers respond posi-
tively to an environment affording potentially greater possibilities of gaining
permanent employment. There is no natural lag period to choose for the
incentives measure, so we experiment with models with a one lag period (gijt-1)
and a distributed lag of two periods and (gijt-1 + gijt-2)/2. The latter allows for
more time for information to become available to workers in departments.
5
In addition, we examine effects in departmental settings where temporary job
loss is low and the incentive effects, associated with screening of temporary
workers, may be stronger. Finally, as equation (2) is estimated with both
departmental and worker ﬁxed effects, estimates of j should not be deter-
mined by, for instance, departments with higher transition rates to perma-
nent employment also being those departments that have better hiring
practices or that provide a work environment that is more conducive to
higher worker effort.
5. Results
Employment Protection and Absenteeism
Figure 1 presents the cohort of temporary workers’ absence normalized to
the time at which they transit to permanent employment. Speciﬁcally, time 0
on the x-axis refers to the quarter in which the worker made the transition
from a temporary to a permanent contract. As a result, period 0 covers a
quarter within which we do not perfectly observe the timing of the transition
between contract types. Hence, we do not know exactly how much of the
absence in this period occurred while the worker was on a temporary con-
tract. A better comparison is between the periods denoted -1 and 1. The raw
difference in absenteeism calculated in this way reveals marked gender dif-
ferences in the contract effect on absence. For males, there is an increase in
absence of 1.32 hours per quarter; while for females, the increase is higher at
2.35 hours per quarter. An alternative approach is to look at mean differ-
ences in absenteeism over the whole period before and after transition, which
reveals a mean difference of 3.16 and 3.30 hours for males and females,
respectively.
Figure 2 plots mean absence over time for the cohort of temporary
entrants (i.e. the x-axis runs from the quarter of entry through to the last
12 British Journal of Industrial Relations
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.quarter that they are observed). It is immediately noticeable that temporary
workers take very little absence in the ﬁrst two quarters. There is a marked
increase in absence after this time, which is not associated with any system-
atic contract change for the cohort.
6 This tenure pattern could reﬂect so
called ‘early career concerns’ (Holmstrom 1999). Consequently, the apparent
contract effects on absence reported in Figure 1 may be overstated if there is
a positive absence–tenure relationship, especially for those workers making
the transition to a permanent contract early in their tenure with the public
service.
We now examine more formally if workers’ absence increases signiﬁcantly
following a change in contract status from temporary to permanent. As
noted above, a difﬁculty with our data is that we only observe quarterly
intervals (not the actual date of transition). Hence, tenure at the time of
transition is imperfectly observed. This quarter of transition is excluded from
the analysis, as during this quarter, we cannot precisely assign contract
FIGURE 1
Hours Absence by Transition Time to Permanent Employment, Temporary Contract at
Entry Cohort.
Note: Where time zero is the quarter that the temporary worker makes the transition to
permanent employment. The other time periods report the absence in the quarters leading up
to the transition (–4 through -1) and the quarters after making the transition (1 to 4).
Employment Protection on Worker Absence 13
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7 We also exclude the ﬁrst quarter of observation, as by deﬁnition in
this period, all workers are on temporary contracts, and this quarter may not
represent an entire quarter of observation. Again, this decision has only a
minor effect on our main estimates.
Variants of equation (1) were estimated for the cohort, and the results are
reported in Table 3. Initially, we estimate a simple OLS variant of equation
(1) with and without a control for tenure. This provides a ﬁrst indication of
the sensitivity of the estimated contract effect to worker tenure. Following
this, ﬁxed effects are introduced to control for time-invariant differences in
worker and departmental characteristics. For the purposes of comparison,
the raw contract differential in absenteeism is also reported in Table 3.
The OLS estimates with tenure omitted indicate a contract difference in
absence of 2.77 hours per quarter for males and 2.28 hours per quarter for
females. Both estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels.
8 For
illustrative purposes, the ﬁrst column reports the raw differences in tempo-
rary versus permanent contract absenteeism for the cohort sample. When
compared to the OLS estimate, this suggests that some of the differences in
absence behaviour between workers on temporary and permanent contracts
FIGURE 2
Hours Absence by Tenure, Temporary Contract at Entry Cohort.
Note: Where the x-axis is tenure (in quarters) in the public sector.
14 British Journal of Industrial Relations
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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.that we see in the data are in part a result of observable characteristics. This
is more noticeable for females. The next sets of estimates are those including
a control for tenure and its quadratic. This leads to a halving of the estimated
permanent contract effect on absenteeism. This provides some indication
that a sizeable proportion of what might be identiﬁed as possible contract
differences in absence behaviour are associated with the absence–tenure pat-
terns observed in Figure 2.
Estimates of equation (1) with worker and departmental ﬁxed effects are
reported in the next two columns of Table 3. The inclusion of these controls
leads to a small reduction in the estimate of the contract effect for males and
a slight increase for females. When compared to the previous estimates, this
suggests only a minor additional explanatory role for time-invariant unob-
served differences in underlying absence propensities between temporary
workers who gain permanent contracts. The same is true for unobserved
workplace characteristics. These effects are not sufﬁcient to change the
general ﬁndings regarding contract effects.
It is difﬁcult to compare our results to existing estimates in the literature
due to the variety of measures of absence used. To compare to Ichino and
Riphahn (2005), we re-computed our measure of hours absence per quarter
as the percentage of a day lost per week. Assuming 229 working days a year;
52 weeks times ﬁve days a week, then taking away 20 days annual leave and
11 public holidays; provides 57.25 days a quarter on average with 36.25
contractual hours per week. Not all workers are full time, and the mean
full-time equivalency (FTE) of our sample is approximately 0.90, hence
contractual working hours are 32.6 hours per week on average. This recal-
culation leads to initial OLS estimates of 0.037 of a day per week for males
and 0.031 for females; these are very close to the estimates provided by Ichino
and Riphahn (2005). Our ﬁxed effects results are somewhat smaller in the
realm of 0.017 of a day per week. Olsson (2009) reports the percentage
decrease in absence because of a reduction in employment protection in small
ﬁrms. In a similar spirit, we recalculated our contract effects as a percentage
increase in absence. For our ﬁxed-effects estimates, this suggests an average
increase of between 16 per cent and 17 per cent, this is marginally higher than
the 13 per cent effect reported by Olsson (2009).
Our second contention is that this lower absenteeism while in a temporary
contract need not necessarily just reﬂect concerns over dismissal but also a
desire to signal ability and motivation to obtain a permanent contract. The
next section exploits the department level data in Table 2 to provide evidence
on whether there is a link between potential opportunities to gain more
secure employment and worker effort.
Temporary Worker Absenteeism and Permanent Job Opportunities
We initially proceed under the assumption that any inﬂuence of the transition
rate of workers from temporary to permanent employment has a separate
and additive effect on worker absence. This leads us to estimate equation (2).
16 British Journal of Industrial Relations
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models include departmental level ﬁxed effects, hence the estimated effects
are identiﬁed by variation in g over time within the department. We ﬁrst
estimate the equation without the inclusion of average workplace absentee-
ism g () . The estimates support the view that increased transition rates
between temporary and permanent employment decreases absenteeism
(increases effort). In the last two columns of Table 4, we include workplace
absenteeism. This attempts to control for unobservable time-varying changes
inﬂuencing all workers’ absenteeism that may be correlated with variations in
g. This would upwardly bias our estimates of g’s impact on worker absence.
As expected, the estimated incentive effects fall but are statistically robust to
the inclusion of workplace absenteeism. Higher average workplace absentee-
ism is associated with increased individual absenteeism, this is indicative of
possible peer effects, but the potential for reverse causality necessitates
caution in any interpretation of this effect.
The contract effects are of a similar order of magnitude to those reported
earlier. Note, however, that the two lag period model, which drops an addi-
tional period of observation, increases the estimates of contract effects some-
what. Also, recall from Table 2 that departmental variations in temporary
TABLE 4
Absenteeism, Contract Effects and Temporary — Permanent Workforce Linkages,
Temporary Entrant Workers
(I) (II)
Males Females Males Females
Lagged 1 Period




-0.060* [0.020] -0.056* [0.014] -0.044** [0.020] -0.043* [0.014]
Workplace average
absenteeism
0.256* [0.024] 0.195* [0.020]
r
2 0.025 0.017 0.035 0.022
Observations 12259 23279 12255 23248
Average 2 Lagged
Periods




-0.074* [0.020] -0.057* [0.013] -0.053* [0.020] -0.040* [0.013]
Workplace average
absenteeism
0.244* [0.034] 0.173* [0.026]
r
2 0.010 0.019 0.020 0.021
Observations 10267 19667 10264 19643
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI) data. *, **, *** indi-
cate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. All models include controls for time-varying
worker characteristics, individual ﬁxed effects, workplace characteristics and departmental level
ﬁxed effects.
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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.job loss rates, q, are correlated with our measure of movements from tem-
porary to permanent contracts (transition rates) (g). Thus, in unreported
estimates, we included the term (q) in addition to g and g, and we used two
lag structures as above.
For males, increases in the temporary job loss rate were associated with
lowerabsenteeism,butnoeffectcouldbediscernedforfemales.Innocasesdid




estimates — male versus female, different lag structures — this revealed very
consistent and larger estimates of between -0.08 and -0.09, which are statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. This suggests that the effects are
strongerwithinorganizationalenvironmentswherethereispossiblylessthreat
ofjobloss.Thus,whilewecannotbedeﬁnitiveonthisissue,itdoesappearthat
g may be capturing some incentive effects. A high turnover of temporary
workers will mean that the individual worker is competing in an environment
with greater unknown ability of other workers, and standard tournament
theory suggests that this will have an adverse effect on worker effort.
How big are these effects? They range between -0.04 and -0.06 for a 1
percentage variation in the likelihood of gaining a permanent contract. To
put this in context, the standard deviation in this variable across time within
departments is 9 percentage points; hence a 1 standard deviation increase in
the departmental transition rate from the mean would reduce the average
temporary workers’ absenteeism by between 0.36 and 0.54 hours per quarter.
The transition rate (g) should not inﬂuence the behaviour of temporary
workers once they gain a permanent contract. In further tests, we interacted
g with a dummy indicating a permanent contract had been obtained. As
expected, these interaction terms were statistically insigniﬁcant and approxi-
mately zero, while the signs and size of the coefﬁcients on g and the contract
effect were unaffected. Hence, there is no further effect once temporary
workers make the transition to a permanent contract.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning a little more about cohort selection as
this may be critical as the cohort timing effectively deﬁnes which values of g
are used. Equation (2) was re-estimated on a cohort covering temporary
workers who entered the public sector workforce in 2001 quarter 3 to 2002
quarter 2 inclusive (i.e. moving the cohort selection frame ahead two quar-
ters). Estimates for this cohort are reported as Table A3 in the Appendix. As
can be seen, estimates of g largely follow those reported in Table 4. It also
noticeable that estimated contract effects are larger but still comparable to
those reported in earlier tables.
Robustness Checks
This section outlines a range of robustness checks that primarily relate to
estimates of contract effects. Temporary and permanent workers may, on
18 British Journal of Industrial Relations
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.average, work in different geographic areas which vary in terms of underlying
absence probability due to differences in factors such as travel-to-work times
and regional variations in sickness. We introduced postcode level ﬁxed effects
to capture time-invariant location differences and found our main results
were unaffected, although the estimates were less precise. In addition, the
models in Table 3 were re-estimated excluding, in turn, speciﬁc groups of
workers for whom absence behaviour may vary substantially. We excluded
workers who reported having a disability and workers on part-time hours
(full-time equivalency less than, or equal to, 80 per cent). In neither case did
this substantively affect the estimates of contract effects on absenteeism.
Following Ichino and Riphahn (2005), we estimate a variant of equation
(1) where the linear tenure and quadratic term in earlier estimates are
replaced with a dummy variable included for each quarter of tenure omitting
the ﬁrst quarter of tenure that we observe. Even under this quite extreme
speciﬁcation of tenure, we still gained positive and statistically signiﬁcant
contract effects on absence, albeit smaller in magnitude; falling to 0.642 for
males and 0.854 for females. Our results are not driven by our cohort selec-
tion. All of our models were re-estimated on two alternative cohorts, one that
contains all temporary contracted workers who entered between 2001 quarter
2 to 2002 quarter 1 (i.e. one quarter from our main cohort) and also for
another cohort who entered between 2001 quarter 3 to 2002 quarter 2. In no
case did this materially affect the size and signiﬁcance of the estimated
contract effect on absenteeism.
One might also worry that workers have prior knowledge of changes in
contract status and adjust absence behaviour before actually gaining a per-
manent contract. To examine this, a variable was created that incorrectly
ﬂagged a temporary worker as moving to a permanent contract one quarter
before the actual transition occurred. Our main ﬁxed-effects model was
re-estimated with this variable replacing our permanent contract dummy.
Hence, this model identiﬁes the effect of a permanent contract in the period
before transition. The (incorrect) contract effect from models with quadratic
tenure terms was positive but not statistically signiﬁcant,
9 while models
including tenure dummies revealed a contract effect that was substantively
zero. This implies that worker absence behaviour does not reﬂect anticipation
of changes in contract status.
There are two ﬁnal related issues regarding our ﬁxed effects identiﬁcation
strategy that concern the applicability of our estimates as a more general
interpretation of employment protection effects. First, our contract effects
are estimates derived from those that actually transit to permanent employ-
ment. They provide an estimate of the ATT. If there is a non-random assign-
ment of permanent contracts, one might be concerned about the external
validity of the contract estimates. Speciﬁcally, we are concerned that absence
rates before and after a contract change differ between those who are treated
and those who are not. If this is the case, our estimate of ATT is a biased
estimate of the ATE. We sought to examine this by investigating the distri-
bution of pre-treatment absence across tenure in the public sector. In
Employment Protection on Worker Absence 19
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.Figure 3, on the left-hand side we plot the mean absence–tenure patterns of
workers who remained in temporary employment throughout the sample
period. The right-hand side illustrates the mean absence of those who tran-
sited to permanent employment at some stage, while they were in temporary
employment. While the two plots are not identical, there do not appear to be
major differences in absence–tenure patterns. Moreover, absence levels are
not statistically different, at standard levels of statistical signiﬁcance, between
the two groups for quarters 2–7 of tenure.
Next, we seek to implement an instrumental variable approach to identify
the contract effect. MOHRI, being administrative data, does not contain
many suitable candidates for instruments. We focus on two sources of varia-
tionintheassignmentoftemporaryworkerstopermanentcontractsthatmeet
the statistical requirements for instrument validity and for which some eco-
nomicintuitioncanbeprovided.ThesearedrawnfromthecompleteMOHRI




quarter is intuitively appealing as it provides a potential opening for a tempo-
rary worker in the short-run, but it is unlikely to be correlated with unobserv-
ables that affect our cohort’s absence behaviour. The second instrument we
use is the time-varying proportion of the workforce in a department that are
FIGURE 3
Sickness Absence by Tenure, Non-Movers (Untreated Temporary Workers) versus




























Non-Movers Movers (While Still Temporary)
234567 234567
Note: Where the x-axis is tenure (in quarters) in the public sector.
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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2012.temporary. Such within department variations affect the probability that a
worker will remain on a temporary contract.
11
The results are presented in Table 5. For males, both our instruments
passed the key validity tests of under-identiﬁcation (Cragg–Donald Wald
Stat (2) = 349.91), weak identiﬁcation (Cragg–Donald Wald Stat = 174.622)
and validity of exclusion restrictions (Sargan = 0.034). For females, the cor-
responding test statistics are under-identiﬁcation (Cragg–Donald Wald Stat
(1) = 751.64), weak identiﬁcation (Cragg–Donald Wald Stat = 751.12) and
validity of exclusion restrictions (Stock–Wright = 1.24). The IV estimates are
higher but not statistically signiﬁcantly different from the OLS or worker
ﬁxed-effects contract estimates reported in Table 3. These results provide
some evidence that our estimated contract effect is not markedly biased by
endogeneity of permanent contract status.
In summary, our estimates of the contract effects suggest an approximate
increase in absenteeism of 1.1 to 2 hours per quarter (for instance female OLS
vs female IV). In comparable terms to previous evidence, this equates to
approximately 0.017 to 0.0260 of a day per week. This suggests a somewhat
smaller employment protection effect in our setting when compared to that
estimated from probationary periods in an Italian bank (0.04 reported by
Ichino and Riphahn 2005). Moreover, our results appear quite stable across
a variety of speciﬁcations and identiﬁcation strategies.
6. Conclusion
This article sought to make two contributions to the understanding of the
effects of employment protection on worker behaviour.
First, we provide evidence on the impact of employment protection on
worker absence in settings where the transition to permanent employment is
TABLE 5
Absenteeism and the Transition to Permanent Employment — Instrumental Variables
Estimates, Temporary Entrant Workers
Males Females
Permanent 1.730** [0.859] 2.064* [0.713]
Instruments
Proportion of department temporary -0.057 [0.003] -0.047 [0.002]




Cragg–Donald Wald F-statistics 349.91 751.64
Sargan statistic 0.034 1.240
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI) data. *, ** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Controls for tenure,
ethnicity, disability, occupation, age, FTE, Establishment size and seasonal dummies included
but not reported.
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nizations but where there is a common dichotomy between jobs with very
little employment protection, temporary contracts and jobs with a quite
extreme level of employment protection, permanent contracts. We estimated
models of discretionary worker absence identifying the impact of a change in
contract status from less to more protected employment. A movement into a
permanent contract leads to increased worker absence. These estimates are
robust to a variety of speciﬁcations, robustness tests and identiﬁcation strat-
egies. Our estimates of the impact on absence of a move to permanent
employment, in the order of 0.02 of a day per week, are roughly half the size
of those reported in more speciﬁc ﬁxed probationary institutional settings
such as that in Ichino and Riphahn (2004, 2005) but similar to estimates
identiﬁed from changes in employment protection exemptions in small ﬁrms
(Olsson 2009).
Second, we investigated how the rate of movement of workers between
temporary and permanent employment inﬂuences absence behaviour of
workers with lower employment protection. It was found that increases in the
likelihood of gaining a permanent job, proxied by temporary to permanent
transition rates, was associated with temporary workers exerting more effort
(take less absence), where we included a control to capture other time-varying
changes in workplace environment and culture that may affect worker
absence behaviour. This effect did not change the contract status estimates
and was just under half the size of the contract status change effect. The
inﬂuence of variations in the likelihood of movement from temporary to
permanent jobs on absence behaviour is a ﬁrst piece of informative evidence
for organizations operating in an increasingly ﬂuid employment legislation
environment. For example, policies that change the employment protection
of permanent workers and the conversion of temporary contracts to perma-
nent contracts (Dolado et al. 2002) are likely to impact on the effort of
temporary workers. These additional effects of legislative changes have not
been considered thus far.
As noted earlier, changes in employment protection can have complex
effects on worker effort. For instance, easing of unfair dismissal laws could
lead to increases in some workers’ effort due to an increase in the risk of
job loss, but may have a contrary effect on others if protected jobs become
scarcer. Our results illustrated how the institutional setting and use of
temporary employment can affect the impact of changes in contract
status.
Final version accepted on 5 July 2012.
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Notes
1. The data cover a period in Australia that was preceded by some signiﬁcant
reforms in the labour market related to wage bargaining and unfair dismissal
provisions that were part of a general trend to reduce regulation in the labour
market. These could have the effect of increasing the quality of the pool of
temporary workers and the attractiveness of tenured permanent employment in
the public sector.
2. A theoretical rationale is that in the presence of uncertainty about the underlying
ability of workers, there will be an incentive for new workers to signal ability
through increased effort early in an employment spell (Holmstrom 1999; Koszegi
and Li 2008).
3. We use 60 hours a quarter as this cut-off; however, our key estimates are not
particularly sensitive to the exact cut-off chosen.
4. To maintain anonymity of departments, we do not report names. In this table to
provide a more consistent pattern of these variables, only departments who were
present in our data for at least 12 quarters are reported.
5. Longer lags of g were also tested. These resulted in estimates of a similar magni-
tudes to those reported, however the estimates were less precise.
6. Similar absence to tenure patterns are reported for representative data for the UK
labour force by Ercolani (2006).
7. In all estimation excluding period 0 has a small positive effect on the estimate of
the permanent contract effect.
8. All pooled results are clustered at the individual level; one might also be con-
cerned about correlated shocks at the agency level. In unreported estimates, we
also clustered standard errors at the agency level. As expected, this increased the
size of the standard errors. However, it did not change the pattern of signiﬁcance
of the key estimates.
9. Estimates of 0.505 [s.e. 0.461] and 0.245 [s.e. 0.326] for males and females,
respectively.
10. Note that we exclude those individuals who are in our temporary entry cohort
when calculating these variables.
11. One might be concerned that both of these instruments may reﬂect workplace
stress/conditions in some way. For instance, lower morale leading to higher
absence and higher permanent quit rates. This may lead to our instrument being
not validly excluded. In unreported estimates, we sought to investigate this by
experimenting with workplace absence averages and found this did not affect our
IV estimates.
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Sample Means by Gender, Temporary Entrant Workers
Male Female
Age (years) 33.609 32.156






Full-time equivalency (FTE) 0.941 0.877
Hourly wage ($AUD) 18.344 17.79
Establishment size (number of workers) 298.975 316.002
Workforce temporary (%) 0.137 0.135
Occupation
1. Manager 0.017 0.018
2. Other professional 0.266 0.197
3. Teacher 0.137 0.206
4. Nurse 0.002 0.013
5. Associate professionals 0.113 0.072
6. Tradespersons 0.088 0.002
7. Advanced clerical and service workers 0.013 0.025
8. Intermediate clerical, sales and service workers 0.170 0.314
9. Intermediate production and transport workers 0.011 0.002
10. Elementary clerical, sales and service workers 0.089 0.117
11. Labourers and related workers 0.094 0.034
Observations 1,922 3,458
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI).
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Tenure and Transition to Permanent Contract, Temporary Entrant Workers
Males transitions Females transitions
2
nd Quarter 102 [0.053] 203 [0.059]
3
rd Quarter 115 [0.070] 271 [0.088]
4
th Quarter 98 [0.066] 145 [0.052]
5
th Quarter 122 [0.095] 235 [0.095]
6th Quarter 52 [0.049] 92 [0.045]
7th Quarter 47 [0.050] 86 [0.048]
8
th Quarter 30 [0.036] 67 [0.041]
9
th Quarter 35 [0.044] 66 [0.042]
10
th Quarter 19 [0.025] 38 [0.026]
11th Quarter 20 [0.028] 41 [0.030]
12
th Quarter 11 [0.017] 28 [0.022]
13th Quarter 6 [0.013] 21 [0.024]
14
th Quarter 5 [0.016] 10 [0.016]
15th Quarter 1 [0.011] 1 [0.005]
Total Transitions 663 1,304
% Make Transition in Sample 0.345 0.377
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI). Quarterly rates of
transition in parentheses.
TABLE A3
Absenteeism, Contract Effects and Temporary and Permanent Workforce Linkages,
Alternative Cohort of Temporary Entrant Workers
(I) (II)
Males Females Males Females
Lagged 1 Period




-0.079* [0.020] -0.079* [0.014] -0.058* [0.020] -0.058* [0.014]
Workplace Average
Absenteeism
0.242* [0.026] 0.184* [0.020]
r
2 0.041 0.031 0.042 0.033
Observations 11,596 21507 11596 21507
Average 2 Lagged
Periods




-0.071* [0.020] -0.066* [0.012] -0.050** [0.020] -0.051* [0.013]
Workplace Average
Absenteeism
0.231* [0.033] 0.161* [0.026]
r
2 0.017 0.026 0.024 0.021
Observations 8299 15594 8299 15594
Source: Minimum Obligatory Human Resources Information (MOHRI) data. *, ** indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. All models include controls for time varying worker charac-
teristics, individual ﬁxed effects, workplace characteristics, non-parametric tenure dummies and
departmental level ﬁxed effects.
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